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United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., ___ F. 3d ___, 2017 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 10477, 2017 WL 2541042 (9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Ryan L. Hickey 
 
Attempts to alter water use agreements, especially those spanning 
back decades or even centuries, elicit intense scrutiny from water rights 
holders. In United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist.1, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld application of a 1935 Decree apportioning water among various 
regional entities, including two Indian tribes, to bar a mineral company 
from transferring water rights between properties within the Gila River 
drainage. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
From its New Mexico headwaters, the Gila River flows roughly 
500 miles west across Arizona before intersecting with the Colorado River 
near Yuma.2 Most of its water, however, does not make it that far, with the 
stream often running dry halfway through its drainage.3 The Gila’s water 
woes are not an anomaly in the southwest, where high temperatures, 
limited precipitation, and burgeoning demand stress virtually all regional 
water sources. Moreover, competition among users, whether individuals, 
industries, or entire municipalities and even states, can be fierce.  
The Gila highlights this; water controversies have recently arisen 
between New Mexico and Arizona4, Phoenix and the Gila River Indian 
Tribe5, and a mineral company and two regional Indian communities. This 
case concerns that last conflict, involving the Gila River Indian 
Community (“Community”), the San Carlos Apache Tribe (“Tribe”), and 
various other water rights holders in the drainage.6 Most notable of that 
last group is Freeport Minerals Corporation (“Freeport”), which began 
purchasing area farms in 1997 primarily for their water rights.7 
                                                 
1.  United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 
2541042 (9th Cir. 2017). 
2. American Rivers, Gila River, Americanrivers.org, 
https://www.americanrivers.org/river/gila-river/ (last visited June 22, 
2017). 
3.  Id. 
4.  Lauren Villagran, Nature Conservancy puts hold on Gila River 
diversion project, ABQJournal.com, 
https://www.abqjournal.com/1016106/nature-conservancy-puts-
hold-on-gila-river-diversion-project.html (June 11, 2017). 
5.  Alden Woods, Gila River Indian Community agrees to water-storage 
deal with Phoenix that will restore flow to Gila River, 
AZCentral.com, 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-water/2017/03/2
1/gila-river-indian-community-agrees-water-storage-deal-phoenix-r
estore-flow-gila-river/9927413/ (March 21, 2017).  
6.  Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 2017 WL 2541042 at *1. 
7.  Id. 
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This case grew out of litigation beginning nearly a century ago 
when, in 1925, the United States first brought suit on behalf of the Tribe 
and Community seeking better Gila River management.8 Those efforts 
culminated in the 1935 Globe Equity Decree (“Decree”), regulating water 
among the Community, Tribe, and other stakeholders.9 The decree granted 
the Community and Tribe senior-most water rights, established that users 
could divert water for “beneficial use” and “irrigation,” and granted that 
users may “change the point of diversion and the places, means, manner 
or purpose of the use of the waters to which they are so entitled or any part 
thereof, so far as they may do so without injury to the rights of other 
parties.”10 These proceedings hinge on that final point. 
 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1993, the district court implemented a “Change in Use Rule” 
specifying how water rights could be severed from one piece of property 
and transferred to another. Doing so required filing a “sever and transfer 
application,” public notice and comment opportunity, and possibly a 
district court hearing.11 At any hearing, the applicant would bear “the 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of no injury to the rights of other 
parties under the Gila Decree.”12  
  In 1996, the district court entered a Water Quality Injunction 
directing the Water Commissioner to limit diversions of upstream water 
rights holders should water quality reaching the Tribe fall below certain 
benchmarks.13 Then, in 2001, groups including the Tribe and Community 
filed a complaint against several thousand landowners (collectively, the 
“Upper Valley Defendants” or “UVDs”) allegedly exceeding decreed 
rights via well pumping.14 That led to the Upper Valley Forbearance 
Agreement (“UVFA”), wherein plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the 
complaint in return for the UVD agreeing to reduce irrigation entitlements 
by 1,000 acres.15 The UVFA also included a provision allowing UVDs to 
sever and transfer water rights from decreed lands to “Hot Lands” not 
previously covered by the decree.16  
In 2008, the United States, Tribe, and Community filed objections 
to 419 sever-and-transfer applications filed under the UVFA, fifty-nine of 
which came from Freeport.17 The district court created a sub-docket 
                                                 
8.  Id. 
9.  United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1430 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
10.  Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 2017 WL 2541042 at *1-2 (emphasis 
added).  
11.  Id. at *2. 
12.  Id.  
13.  Id. at *3. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
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exclusively for Freeport’s applications, from which it chose ten to begin 
review. Initially, the district court ruled Freeport described parcels with 
inadequate specificity, holding that they must state the “precise locations 
of the parcels.”18 Freeport subsequently created more detailed maps and 
descriptions of relevant lands, which it disclosed during discovery in 
November 2009.19  
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the Tribe’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law in August 2010, denying all 
Freeport’s initially reviewed applications.20 It concluded (1) Freeport did 
not present a prima facie case showing no injury to Decree parties, (2) 
Arizona’s statutory forfeiture law did not apply, (3) Freeport partially 
abandoned water rights in one of its parcels, and (4) Freeport would not 
be allowed to update applications with revised maps.21  
Freeport’s first appeal of the district court order failed, as the 
Ninth Circuit deemed it “neither a partial nor a final judgment” and thus 
declined jurisdiction.22 On September 4, 2014, the district court entered 
“final judgment with respect to, and in accordance with, all the Court’s 
orders and proceedings on the 419 applications to sever and transfer 
Decree water rights filed with the Water Commissioner in 2008." 
Thereafter, the United States, the Community, the Tribe, Freeport, and 
several other landowners timely filed appeals and cross-appeals. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Ninth Circuit Panel began by addressing jurisdictional 
questions.23 After determining the court could only properly claim 
jurisdiction over select applications on appeal, the Panel took up the merits 
of Appellant’s arguments.24 
The Panel first considered which applications, if any, were 
appealable.25 At the district court, all 2008 sever-and-transfer applications 
filed by non-Freeport parties were either dismissed without prejudice or 
voluntarily withdrawn.26 “The general rule in [the Ninth C]ircuit” states 
“voluntary dismissals without prejudice do not create appealable, final 
judgments.”27 Likewise, a withdrawn application does not create an 
appealable, final judgment.28 Because “Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement precludes federal courts from deciding questions that cannot 
                                                 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at *4. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at *7-*8. 
25.  Id. at *4-*6. 
26.  Id. at *5. 
27.  Id. at *4 (quoting Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., 
LLC, 548 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
28.  Id. at *5. 
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affect the rights of litigants in the case before them,”29 the Panel 
determined it lacked jurisdiction over non-Freeport applications.30 The 
Court further justified that holding via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b), which requires that a court expressly direct entry of judgment to 
achieve finality in a ruling.31 
Having confined jurisdiction to Freeport, the Court then evaluated 
that firm’s fifty-nine applications.32 Ultimately, it accepted three covered 
by the August 2010 order but not involving restrictive covenants, one in 
which the district court ruled Freeport abandoned its water right,33 and 
fourteen of the twenty denied by the district court in its August 2010 
order.34 Thus, from several hundred options, the Court took up only 
eighteen Freeport applications. 
With jurisdiction addressed, the Court moved on to merits. 
Freeport alleged four issues on appeal. First, the district court erred in 
granting judgment as a matter of law to Plaintiffs.35 Second, the district 
court erroneously denied Freeport’s motion to amend applications with 
revised maps.36 Third, Arizona’s law of statutory forfeiture was 
improperly applied.37 And fourth, the district court erred in finding 
Freeport abandoned water rights on 1.4 acres of one application.38  
Regarding judgment as a matter of law, Freeport disputed the 
district court’s holding that it had not presented a prima facie case of no 
injury to other Decree parties.39 To fulfill this burden, Freeport included a 
generic statement in all applications: 
All that will be changed as a result of this application will be 
the location of decreed rights and associated point of diversion 
under the Globe Equity No. 59 Decree. The priorities, volumes 
of water use and acreage will not change. There will be no net 
increase or decrease in decreed rights as a result of this 
proposed severance and transfer.40  
Freeport provided no further evidence regarding absence of injury, and the 
district court deemed the vague, generalized statement insufficient to meet 
the required burden of proof.41 
This Court not only agreed with the district court, but also 
highlighted possible injuries arising from proposed transfers.42 First, the 
                                                 
29.  Id. at *4 (quoting Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 
827, 834 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)). 
30.  Id. at *5. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at *6. 
33.  Id. at *7. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. at *8. 
36.  Id. at *10. 
37.  Id. at *12. 
38.  Id. at *14. 
39.  Id. at *8. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at *9. 
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Court discussed a unique Gila River feature—“Cosper’s Crossing”—
where the river frequently runs dry above ground.43 When that occurs, 
upstream users can legally divert the entire river before it reaches that 
point.44 Because at least one of Freeport’s applications proposed 
transferring an allotment from downstream of Cosper’s Crossing to 
upstream, the Court noted that change could have broad effects.45 
Specifically, moving an allotment from below to above Cosper’s Crossing 
could cause the crossing to run dry earlier, triggering the provision 
allowing upstream users to divert the entire river earlier as well.46 
The Court then discussed how changed locations could impact 
return flows, and examined transferring a water allotment from a parcel 
used near the river to one used further away.47 Though they take identical 
amounts, those may return different amounts to the river due to 
evaporation, soil consumption, or even movement outside the Gila 
subflow zone.48 Lastly, the Court highlighted an application that would 
turn a ground-level diversion into a well. Such a change could impact river 
salinity, potentially harming downstream users like the Tribe.49 For those 
reasons, plus Freeport’s failure to address potential cumulative effects of 
its many applications, the Court held that Freeport did not show its 
applications would not harm others and thus the district court did not err 
in rejecting the applications on those grounds.50  
Freeport next contested the district court’s denial of its motion to 
amend applications with revised maps. 51 The Court, however, found it was 
unclear whether Freeport ever sought leave to amend those applications.52 
While generally construed liberally to allow amendments, the Court noted 
Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not mandatory.53 
Additionally, because the amended maps constituted “material changes,” 
the Court held allowing Freeport to amend would have prejudiced some 
parties (and may have prejudiced others).54 
Arizona’s law of statutory forfeiture provided the court’s next 
topic, one on which Freeport finally prevailed. The district court 
conducted its own analysis of Arizona’s forfeiture code, which this Court 
deemed erroneous because the Arizona Supreme Court had established 
controlling precedent.55 The Panel thus held “[t]here was no need to 
                                                 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. (See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp 
1444, 1462-66 (D. Ariz. 1996)). 
45.  Id. at *9. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at *10. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. at *11. 
54.  Id. at *11-12. 
55.  Id. at *13 (See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. 
of Maricopa, 193 Ariz. 195 (1999) (en banc)). 
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evaluate further the 1919 water code. The Arizona Supreme Court is the 
final arbiter of Arizona law, and it had already found that statutory 
forfeiture applies to pre-1919 water rights.”56 Consequently, this Court 
instructed the district court to reconsider statutory forfeiture on remand.57 
Finally, the Panel addressed Freeport’s appeal denying it 
abandoned 1.4 acres of water rights in one application.58 This Court held 
that while Freeport made some showings contradicting abandonment (its 
overarching purpose in acquiring lands for water rights, its maintenance 
of water-related facilities, its paying of related taxes and fees), those did 
not overcome the countervailing evidence.59 In particular, because 
Freeport also made improvements suggesting it no longer wanted or 
needed the right in question, and because the district court narrowly 
tailored its finding to 1.4 acres of the 15.5-acre parcel, that ruling was not 
in error.60  
 
IV. CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
Overall, this case highlights the complexities of water law and 
related litigation. Between the diverse stakeholders, near-century of prior 
agreements and proceedings, threshold jurisdictional questions, and 
multiple issues on appeal, parsing relevant facts and law from this decision 
to explain its outcomes—including all of affirm, dismiss, reverse, and 
remand—is challenging. 
The Court’s most notable decision here was affirming denial of 
Freeport’s sever-and-transfer applications due to noncompliance with the 
eighty-year-old Decree. That marked a victory for the Community and 
Tribe, senior-most water rights holders whose downstream location puts 
the quantity and quality of their available water at particular risk. As this 
case reinforced, while those groups have legal mechanisms to address 
upstream conflicts when they occur, the Decree still requires other users 
to prevent such problems in the first place when possible.61 
 
                                                 
56. Id. 
57.  Id. at *14. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. at *14-17. 
60.  Id. at *17. 
61.  Id. at *9. 
